them, could hardly restrain their enthusiasm. 1 And in 1971 when the text was translated into English and published, its success was a foregone conclusion. The excitement that it generated was predicated not only on the argument -and one cannot deny its lure even todaybut also on a rather simple historical fact. This was the first time in over a century that a major philosopher had written directly on the subject of architecture, even though it was Heidegger's ambition to radically shift the discussion away from architecture to "bauen." In other words, the text that help found a disciplinary domain that came to be known as "architectural theory" was a text that demanded that one turn away from architecture and toward something altogether different. Post-Heideggerian theory was not about making architecture better, more meaningful, or more suited to the demands of modern life, but about not making architecture at all' Needless to say, once that particular philosophical challenge presented itself as a possibility, the alliance between architecture and its new philosophical patrons began to take on a life of its own with Peter Eisenman courting Jacques Derrida, and others courting Frederic Jameson or Gilles Deleuze Even though the sparkle of those alliances has waned in recent years-defeated in some sense by the very academe that it sought to reform as well as by a new generation of architectural technocracts and pragmatists-one has to remember the incontrovertible but rarely commented on fact that few philosophers of repute engaged with the discipline of architecture before Heidegger. And the reason is not too hard to establish.
Transcendental metaphysics from the late eighteenth century onward had positioned poetry and music at the apex of aesthetic production, those being, so it was generally assumed, the most refined and immaterial of the arts, and thus the closest to the manifestation of the ideals to which society was obligated to aspire. The only major Enlightenment philosopher to have taken architecture relatively seriously was Georg Friedrich Hegel, for whom architecture belonged, however, primarily to the early Symbolic Age when mankind lacked the tools for a more refined aesthetic articulation. The Symbolic Age stretched from the time of Egyptians (the pyramids are the example Hegel gives) into the Gothic age by which time architecture co-existed with sculpture as the leading form of artistic expression, and sculpture was soon to be replaced by painting and then by poetry Needless to say Hegel's argument forced architecture after the Gothic age to be split against itself. Architecture could no longer match the accomplishments of the higher arts, but nor could it relive the great glory days of the Middle Ages, and this despite the ambitions of latter-day medieval revivalists, for that would have been counter to the idea of dialectic progress.
Architecture was in a philosophical double bind It is my intent in this paper to insist, but also to invert, the legitimacy of this double bind.
Heidegger hoped, of course, to dispense with the problem once and for all by arguing that bauen had a history embedded not in the shallow protocols of civilization, but in an alternative metaphysics of language. Heidegger set out to prove this by showing that the word bauen goes back to buen and beyond that, in an even more distant time, to bin, as in ich bin, or "I am." 2 In making the link between Building and Being, one was to realize in what way bauen had not only developed through time, but had also been damaged by its eventual replacement, architecture, which had produced not places in which "one dwells," but rather an endless continuum of "housing," along with open stretches of highway and the "babble" of the radio.
The irony was that in seeking out language's hidden meanings, one encounters a onomatopoeiac word game in which bauen is linked to buan (notice the shift in syllables and missing e), which brings us to bhu (note the lopping off of a syllabic unit), which brings us to beo and then bin. In this way we arrive at the first words of creation, spoken not by God, but so it seems by a mythological Black Forest farmer stomping around on his newly-cleared field. Wife and children, and even the need for protection or clothing are not yet in the picture. Nonethe-less, out of the luminousity of bin. there emerges a host of syllabic slips that create words like Bauer (farmer) and Nachbar, (neighbor) that in a magical way begin to create a linguisticsocial web around Being's origmary force. 3 It is quite possible that surrealist poetry that was all the rage in the 1950s influenced Heidegger in this, for there is something, methodologically speaking, almost Dadaistic in the way words in being rubbed up against each other produce the illusion of a history far more profound that what can be actually proven etymologically. Being, Heidegger, admits, at the very beginning of Being and Time, undergoes a series of "distortions and overpaintings [Ubermalungen] ." that ultimately "trivializes" it presence. 4 In other words, as one moves from ich bin to ich beo, and thus away from Being and toward the potential for social life, one also moves toward the forgetfulness of language. To retrieve the lost ontic (or should one say iconic) moment, Heidegger argues that one needs a philosophy that works against the force of time. It is a philosophy of destruktion that "sees itself assigned the task of interpreting the foundation of ancient ontology in light of temporality." 5 But as it turns out, architecture could not be so easily inverted, despite the destruktion that was meant to bring us into sight of a pure theoretical thought, if you will, without architecture. The word destruktion -a German spelling of a French word -was used to reveal the inadequacy of the German language to think against the grain of the germanic bin. In other words, there is something purposefully foreign to the uncovery of truth. It requires an outsider's perspective, even though it is only a tactical necessity.
But a destruktion can only happen if one knows the how to identify the interfering structure without by accident obliterating the underlying truth, an operation methodologically akin to architecture itself Thus, in some sense there is something necessarily architectural in the uncovery to Being, with the irony being that the redeeming force of language-as it slips and slides its way into the present-turns out to be a slow-acting poison that dooms bauen at the very moment it becomes "historical." In other words, the very fiction that was meant to show that there was an alternative to architecture embeds within it -albeit unwittingly-the legitimacy of architecture itself. And even though it is only a temporary engagement, architecture, like a virus, has learned to survive in unfriendly conditions; it infects and ultimately undermines Being, entering the system unnoticed at the first linguistic break from bin to bhu The double bind of architecture in the nineteenth century has become a double negation in Heidegger. Architecture, though ostensibly that which has to be destroyed, had first to get rebuilt in a foreign etymology in order to set up the methodological alienation necessary for bauen. One comes to the awkward conclusion that architecture becomes yet again, precisely, ar-chitecture at the very moment that its detachment from philosophy becomes in Heidegger its attachment to it.
All in all, the story of architecture is a strange and even a desperate one From the early nineteenth century onward, architecture was seen philosophically as an archaic and limited form of consciousness that has been transcended by the other arts and allowed to exist in a type of perpetual death. Architecture lived a double life, either below or above the cultural horizon.
And once abandoned by philosophy, architecture could all the more be locked out of the house to become the evidence for the pathology of modernity And yet architecture, like a force of nature unto itself, managed to persevere as a double negation within the very body of bauen One can see how this still plays itself out in the works of Jean Nouvel which seek out an evocation of the modern sublime rising above the huddled vernaculars of the everyday. "The architect," he writes, "is always a receiver, an amplifier and a 'retransmitter .'" In order to create anything, he goes on to say, "you first have to feel emotion in your head, and then manage to reinterpret it with your maximum possible strength and in that way enable the whole world to experience it as well." 6 But the struggle to situate architecture only returns to the unsituatedness that was imposed so categorically on it by nineteenth century philosophers.
In other words, Nouvel's architecture comes into itself as both a physical object announcing its autonomy from the other arts, and at the same time as a repre- home all of its own. In other words, the release of architecture from philosophical and contemporary-cultural relevancy by Enlightenment thinkers and its relegation to the world of "applied arts," opened up a space of disciplinary anxiety that became exactly that which -in its amalgamated cohesion-we now call architecture.
Its beginnings conform to the shift in knowledge in eighteenth century, which Michel Foucault pointed to, from a despotic to a strategic articulation of power and knowledge. The disciplines that arose in the eighteenth century were designed to make the detail functional and docile, and architecture, with no where else to go, had to interweave itself with increasing determinacy in that direction. The history of architecture is a history out of which there was no escape, becoming something with an inbuilt social-temporal co-efficient, literally a cours a"architecture running along side and giving physical shape to the ideology of mastery, nationalism, colonialism and capitalism Architecture (and the aesthetic that organized and obscured its negations) had to be eminently epistemological, reminding itself again and again that it was eminently applicable to the presumed needs of Mankind. But as Theodor Adorno so eloquently wrote, "that which once helped free philosophy from the chains of theology" became itself "a shackle which forbids thought from thinking." 7 And so, we stand before the uncertainty of what architecture is, but not because architecture lacks substance and meaning.
We stand, rather, before the uncertainty, more specifically, of architecture's singularity, where the word "architecture" when standing alone survives to indicate a space of vacuation that obscures something that is not a singular and yet not a plural either. It would far exceed the length restrictions on this essay to show in what way the history of architecture is written out and overits own voided space, for to do so, one would have to conceptualize history with both a backward-and forward looking gaze. But if we can see in Heidegger a philosophizing over the space of something that failed to transpire, and that yet managed to survive unnoticed within the flesh of that which was not architecture, we come to the essential equation ( There was a time when the literalness of this problem was apparent, when, for example, architects sought out underpasses, basements and other types of presumably marginal spaces as a way to give voice to alternative reality. In this respect, one can allude to the work of Zaha Hadid which accepts the invented landscape as the starting and end point of a processes that denies both bauen and architecture. But as important as that is as a response to the double absence of the philosophical in architecture, the solution, to put it simply, needs to be more than non-architecture. In other words, instead of making that which is not-bauen into architecture, one needs to go one step further and make that which is architecture (in all its negativities) all the more insistently into architecture so as to decipher the presence of the models of reality that thrust themselves forward as if they were invisible. Thinking of architecture as an event city or as architecture based on the proliferations of media are only a partial and incomplete step in the right direction that often naively mistakes architecture as a presence (or as a form of "empowerment") rather than an absence. It sees architecture as something that one still has to destroy when in actuality architecture, as such, was only possible as a self-destruction to begin with. This is not to say that architecture has to become a game of signifiers.
Rather, we must stand back from the attempts to compare architecture with bauen just as much as we should avoid comparing architecture with the "vernacular" and with "art." But we should also avoid falling in the other direction and equating architecture with contemporary "media," (even though one cannot deny a certain proximity). Such antinomies Jarzombek 69 explain the different fields of activities that these disciplines are said to define but do little more. Instead architecturein a state of dialectical abandonment in philosophy-needs to be continually paired with architecture itself, as in the following equation: "architecture/architecture." I am speaking diagrammatically. I am not saying what architecture should look like, or how an architect should start the design process. This equation is not a demand for a new type of architecture, but itself a description of architecture as it is (and as it is not) in the intersection between time and space. The duality of the words is thus not a dualism but points rather to various possible multiples, even to a mirroring of the term "architecture," and also to its potential repetition as well as the double location of its representation traiectory. And, because it is split against itself, the equation points to a repression of one word under the other, and to the struggle of the repressed against its master. Unlike the deforming energy of the translation from bin to bauen that left one at best with an ephemeral "poetics" with its pretences of science and rigor, a more properly "deforming translation," to use the words of Jacques Derrida, starts with and ends at a point where architecture can bring out of hiding the unclarity of its productive dialectic of impossibility 8 In this way we can protest against the attempts to erase, forget, deny, if not overtly obliterate architecture's historical and theoretical unsituatedness in Enlightenment thought. Naturally in the equation "architecture/architecture" there is a danger of it collapse into nothing. But if we cycle architecture into its intransitiveness then we are helping create a vicious circle or better yet, a tautology that opens up a space of uncertainty as to what is being represented by the word "architecture." The equation of how to operate in that was, of course, opened up by the Enlightenment. Once philosophy decided to give up its metaphysical alliance, it had to nonetheless thicken itself to both define and protect its newfound purpose. Kant asks how do we judge judging. Hegel makes it clear that it is not history that he is interested in but the history-of-history, and for that reason he challenged the falsity of certain historiographies to clear the way for a purer and more powerful form of historical presence. Similarly Nietzsche asks not what value is, but, What is "the value of value?" Heidegger asks, What is the being-of-being? This doubling -an architecture all its own -brings both criticism and its object into alignment and this is both strength and weakness of modern philosophy Would it not be right to integrate this architectural ideogram into architectural speculation, for it would allow us to see architecture's history as a signifier of philosophy's absence in the context of architecture's modernity? By the time August Pugin, for example, wrote An Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture (1843), architecture was already determined by what it could not do. It was already articulating its status as an outcast. And once detached from philosophical represen-tation, and then attached by way of compensation to the representation of its failure (in the mode of historicism), architecture came to exist right up to our own day only in a dispersed way.
The equation "architecture/architecture" keeps us from closing that gap again and from hardening us against the return to the singular.
My interest in these remarks is to reinvest critical discourse with something more than an appreciation of architecture's numerous disciplines, its technical masteries or design virtuosities I want to challenge the notion that architecture can spatially define the needs of the present. Architecture can never escape from the negativity that gave it the set of disciplinary rules by which it came to have its history. I want to reestablish the primacy of that history to architecture, by which I mean, once again, not that architectural history (the discipline) holds the key to understanding architecture, but that architecture exists only by means of a historical function that is equivalent to its lack of philosophical and thus and historical relevance. Having been detached from philosophy's higher aims and having thus to situate itself as best it could within the framework of disciplinary structures and expectations, there was a moment when architecture wanted nothing more than to give itself over to historicism, to the call of professionalism, to the scientific protocols of the rationalists, to the diagrams of the engineers, to the ambitions of corporate ideologies, to the formalism of art historians and even to the phenomenology of Heideggerians.
And yet that which we call architecture seems to always leak out beyond these limitations leaving it in that strange state of having never been truly alive and yet not ever being quite dead.
It is in this context that we should seek both a theory and practice of architecture Notes: 1 The lecture was published in 1954 in Martin Heidegger, Vortrage und Autsatze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954) It was published in English as "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Poetry Language Thought, ed J. Glenn Gray, trans.
Albert Hofstadter, (New York Harper, 1971 ), 143-163. The absence of commas in the title of the lecture was intended to enforce the equivalence of the three. 
